Contemporary US-Cuba Relations: Interview with William M. Leogrande and Michael J. Bustamante | May 07, 2024
Dear Friends,
The U.S.-Cuba News Brief is back after a brief hiatus! Prepare for weekly updates that cover everything from U.S.-Cuba relations to Cuba’s foreign and domestic affairs, including the latest on migration.
2023 was an exceptionally busy year for our team, and 2024 is shaping up to continue that trend! Since January, we have led two Congressional delegations to the region—one to Cuba and one to Panama—conducted research in Ecuador and laid the groundwork for a new chapter in our organization's history.
If you're interested in learning more about our delegation to Cuba, we encourage you to listen to Representative Pramila Jayapal’s insightful interview with Ben Rhodes on Pod Save the World here.
Currently, we are in Guatemala participating in the Los Angeles Declaration and Protection third Ministerial meeting. Here, we are collaborating with civil society groups to address migration challenges across the Americas, with a particular focus on Cuban migration.
We are thrilled to relaunch our interview series this week, featuring insights on the current state of US-Cuba relations from William LeoGrande, Professor of Government at American University, and Michael J. Bustamante, Associate Professor of History and Emilio Bacardí Moreau Chair in Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. More exciting interviews are on the horizon—stay tuned!
After promising during the 2020 campaign to re-engage with Cuba and roll back many of President Trump’s sanctions, President Joe Biden took no action until the July 11, 2021 protests and an unprecedented number of Cuban migrants arrived at the U.S. - Mexico border forced the administration to respond. In your opinion, will Cuba policy play a role in President Biden'sBiden 2024 campaign? Could re-election allow President Biden to ignore domestic political pressure and fulfill his old promises?
Leogrande: Cuba is not likely to play a role in the U.S. presidential campaign unless there is some unexpected event that propels it into the headlines. In 2020, Biden did his best to avoid saying anything about Cuba for fear of alienating Cuban American voters. The 2024 campaign says that they will target Florida as a possible swing state, so they will most likely pursue the same strategy as in 2020. In addition, the Senate race in Florida could be crucial for the Democrats holding control of the Senate. Three Democratic seats are vulnerable—Montana, Ohio, and West Virginia. One of the only Republican seats that is even slightly vulnerable is Rick Scott’s in Florida, so Biden will do nothing on Cuba that could complicate Debbie Mucarsel-Powell’s Senate campaign. If Biden is re-elected, then a policy more open to engagement is certainly possible, but after three years of Biden hewing so closely to Trump’s policy, it seems unlikely that he would suddenly reverse course and embrace Obama’s normalization.
Bustamante: I read Biden’s 2020 promises a bit differently. He committed to lifting some of the more onerous restrictions on travel and remittances that Trump put in place, but not more, and not to broad “re-engagement.”
But you’re right: once in office, Biden delayed any action on Cuba until circumstances forced the White House’s hand, albeit in contradictory ways. The crackdown against July 11 protestors created a deeply unpropitious environment for the United States to take steps toward sanctions relief. Quite the contrary: Biden added targeted, if largely symbolic, sanctions against those responsible for mass arrests. But the subsequent migratory exodus—the largest in Cuba’s history—eventually compelled the administration to take modest steps to restore some travel and remittances, to inject a modicum of income into the economy and try to stem the tide. It was too little too late, as subsequent months showed
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Cubans are increasingly making use of public space to express their grievances which include material needs, such as food and electricity, as well as discontent with their government. The Cuban government blames the embargo for its economic crisis and accuses the United States of interference. The U.S. government seems to be indifferent to what is happening on the island. How do you see these playing out? What could be done to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Cuba?
Leogrande: U.S. policy at this moment is deeply cynical, claiming to support the Cuban people while being tough on the government—as if it were possible to crush the economy without immiserating the Cuban population. The immediate humanitarian crisis is due to the government’s inability to import basic necessities—food, fuel, and medicine—because its foreign exchange earnings have fallen 40 percent from pre-COVID levels. To be sure, the government’s policy failures have created structural weaknesses in the economy. But the current shortage of foreign exchange is largely the result of the Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” designed to cut off all sources of hard currency flowing to the island—remittances, U.S. tourism, cheap oil from Venezuela, and revenue from the export of medical services.
Biden has left many of Trump’s sanctions in place, hamstringing Cuba’s ability to recover from the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic. If Biden really cared about the suffering of the Cuban people, he could authorize direct humanitarian assistance in the form of food and medicine channeled through the international Red Cross. He could proactively encourage UN relief agencies to respond positively to Cuba’s recent request for assistance. He could work with the European Union to encourage a coordinated aid response from EU member states. And he could lift certain sanctions—like taking Cuba off the terrorism list—that would make it easier for Cuba to import the basic goods people so desperately need.
Bustamante: The debate about the embargo and its impact on Cuba seems stuck in a futile, circular pattern with no room for nuance.
In the Cuban diaspora, many insist that the embargo is functionally “non-existent” because Cuba can trade with other countries or even import food from the United States under the 2000 TSRA. More modestly, others will contend that “it isn’t the real reason for Cuba’s economic woes today” or its political injustices. On the other hand, Cuban officials and “solidarity” circles abroad often talk about U.S. sanctions as if they are the ONLY cause of the economy’s ills and the contemporary crisis. Neither position, in my view, holds up to scrutiny.
Of course U.S. sanctions have effects on the Cuban economy, directly and indirectly (e.g. through overcompliance in the international banking system). If not, what would be their point? Symbolism alone? If sanctions were lifted tomorrow, would the Cuban economy improve? Naturally. But the depth of today’s crisis also owes to a stubborn refusal on the part of Cuban officials over the last 15 years (or the past 30, if we go back to the Special Period) to engage in comprehensive, consistent economic reform. And don’t take my word for it: this is the argument Cuba’s best economists have been making more and more, as have many of Cuba’s closest allies privately (e.g. China)
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Recent updates on Us-cuba relations
On April 15, 2024, Johanna Tablada, Cuba’s deputy director of U.S. Affairs, emphasized the need for easing U.S. sanctions and ending "special treatment" for Cuban migrants entering the United States illegally, in anticipation of bilateral migration talks in Washington, D.C., the following day (Reuters). During these discussions on April 16, led by Vice Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío for Cuba and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric Jacobstein for the U.S., both sides addressed the challenges of safe, legal, and orderly migration (MINREX, Reuters).
In an interview while in Washington, Vice Minister de Cossío highlighted the importance of removing the "privileged position" of Cubans attempting to cross the border without a visa and lifting the embargo to ensure safe, secure, and orderly migration. He also affirmed Cuba's commitment to increasing the frequency of deportation flights back to the island, currently only once a month (CBS News).
Following these talks, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release stating that reinstating the issuance of non-immigrant visas at the U.S. Embassy in Havana is essential to curbing irregular migration from Cuba.
Despite these negotiations, the dynamic of US-Cuba relations remains largely unchanged. Since late 2021, over 500,000 people have fled Cuba—representing more than 4% of the country's population—in the largest exodus from the island to date.
For further insights into contemporary US-Cuba relations, we encourage you to explore our U.S.-Cuba News Briefs Archive here.
Interested in learning more about Cuban migration to the US? Check out CEDA’s updates on Cuban migration charts here!
If you love the U.S.-Cuba News Brief, make sure to check out our partnership with the America’s Migration Brief for weekly developments and analysis on migration across the Americas!
In case you haven’t heard, after over 18 years of impactful work, CDA adopted a new identity to better reflect our evolving mission across the Americas. On April 25, 2024, we officially became CEDA, short for the Center for Engagement and Advocacy in the Americas (pronounced seh-dah/se-da).
This rebrand signifies our dedication to building bridges and catalyzing solutions throughout the region. Stemming from a comprehensive strategic visioning process in 2023, our new name and visual identity capture the essence of our engagement and advocacy efforts, focusing on policies that enhance the well-being and uphold the dignity and rights of individuals across the Americas.
Our commitments, including our dedication to US-Cuba engagement, remain strong. We continue to champion policies in the United States and the Americas based on partnership, mutual respect, and constructive dialogue. Read more about our rebrand here!
We invite you to explore the new website at www.weareceda.org, which provides further details on the organization's strategic direction, values, and ways to get involved.
*The views and opinions expressed by authors are their own and articles do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of CEDA.