The Socioeconomic Impact of the Cuban Exodus: Interview with Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos Espiñeira
Juan Carlos Albizu-Campos Espiñeira, Doctor of Economic Sciences and Demography, Full Professor, Christian Center for Reflection and Dialogue-Cuba, shares his thoughts on the socioeconomic impacts of Cuban migration and potential policy measures to address these challenges.
Lee la entrevista en español aquí.
June 2024
*The views and opinions expressed by interviewees are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of CEDA.
1. Given the notable increase in Cuban migration to the United States since 2022, what are the immediate and long-term implications for both Cuba and the United States in terms of immigration policies, and social integration?
Cuban emigration to the United States is nothing more than a social response to the economic, political, and social stress that has affected the country for more than six decades. This process is equally impacted by the dispute between Cuba and the US, leading to the formation of an important Cuban community in the US. This community has created a strong support network for migration for more than 60 years and has been nourished with each new migratory wave that arrives there.
The first short-term implication that should undoubtedly be mentioned is the reduction in the total Cuban population. This emigration has been selective by age, sex, and skin color, favoring those who are white, female, and between 15 and 59 years old. This has had a clear impact on fertility rates and led to a decline in birth rate due to the high number of women of childbearing age (15-59 years) who are part of the migratory flows out of Cuba.
Without a doubt, it serves as a political agenda for Cuban authorities. By reinforcing emigration, it seeks to consolidate the sending of remittances as a source of financing, a political lobby, and a means of accessing basic products through the exceptions in the embargo.
2. Considering the substantial proportion of economically active individuals who have emigrated, what are the potential consequences for the Cuban labor market, and how might this affect Cuba's economic development, workforce dynamics, and productivity levels?
Due to the high number of departures over the last three years, the demographic window of opportunity that is crucial to the Cuban economic model has started to close more rapidly. As such, 80 percent of those leaving the country are between the ages of 15 to 64, fit for economic activity, and are qualified to work. This reflects the model’s inability to absorb such a large number of available workers, which could be approximately 3 million people. In any case, the country would not face a short and medium-term labor shortage.
This is all because the model is stagnant, having lost its sources of accumulation and currently acting as its own obstacle to the country’s economic development. For context, there is limited use of technology in the economy, as well as very low labor productivity–now lower than in 1958–and a GDP per capita that increased by only 40 percent between 1957 and 2017. It has an annual [population] growth rate of 0.6 percent, one of the lowest in the world, and the loss of population in active and qualified age groups is even more serious. One of the clearest and most drastic examples of this is related to the existing correlation between rural depopulation and the severe food crisis the country is experiencing.
Cuba will need to transition from the current model of “equality in misery” to a model of economic development and prosperity. This will require addressing inequality by creating containment funds that guarantee the resilience of vulnerable groups and those in worse conditions. Solving the current economic problems and distortions will require significant investment, effort, and time. The first step would be to officially recognize that the country is in a true state of emergency and demands a strong commitment from all aid agencies and international funds for humanitarian management.
3. How does the current economic model in Cuba align with the demographic challenges the country is facing? What are the potential strategies or policy measures that could address the demographic and economic imbalances, including the loss of demographic bonus, underutilization of gender equality benefits, low wages and purchasing power, wealth polarization, rural depopulation, and declining agricultural productivity?
The demographic processes that the country is currently undergoing are not the cause of the problems but rather a result of adaptive behaviors adopted by the population in response to the in response to the prolonged polycrisis affecting the country since the 1960s. These so-called "demographic challenges" act as what Díaz-Briquets calls "the canary in the mine," revealing the system’s economic performance's negative impact on the people’s well-being and ability to meet even their most basic needs.
Thus, several areas have been identified where the population faces unavoidable challenges:
AREA: HUMAN REPRODUCTION, DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS, COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION
- Mortality: Demographic fragility (humanitarian crisis and decline in life expectancy at all ages).
- Fertility: Malthusianism of poverty (children as an immediate risk to survival within families due to the high cost of investment they imply).
- Composition and structure of the population: Demographic aging in the absence of economic development (reproductive revolution without productive revolution).
- Demographic dynamics: The canary in the mine (Second demographic transition and series of crises).
AREA: SPACE, MOBILITY, AND SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION
- International migrations: Loss of symmetry (structural asymmetry between the population and migratory flows).
- Internal migrations: Rural emptying (exodus from countryside to cities and depopulation).
- Spatial distribution: depeasantization (loss of rural social fabric).
AREA: POPULATION ECONOMY
- Social sphere: Ideological fracture (devaluation of work. Growing working-age population, capable and qualified to work, not even seeking employment).
- Labor sphere: Contraction of formal spaces (loss of jobs in the formal economy. Extinction of demographic bonuses and neglect of gender bonuses).
- Well-being and human development: Polarization of opportunities (fall in purchasing power parity of wages and pensions, income concentration, absence of policies to contain poverty and vulnerabilities).
The economic model is not aligned in a way that can effectively address the solutions to the problems identified in the aforementioned areas.
4. Examining the broader regional context, how do the migration routes taken by Cuban migrants through South and Central America contribute to the overall complexities of migration management in the Americas, and what are the implications for regional cooperation and policy coordination to address these migration flows effectively?
What has happened in recent years is the consequence of all the overlapping crises that have affected the Cuban population. This is also linked to the recent legal changes related to migration (since 2013), which removed most of the obstacles that the population faced, including key issues such as access to travel documents (passports) and the so-called "exit permit," as well as the establishment of new migration corridors.
As a result, the historic Cuban migration pattern, which had considerable symmetry in departures to two main destinations, North America and Europe, has been completely "reformed." This change is particularly due to the exploitation of new routes that do not require visas for many countries. These now serve as departure points for corridors to traditional destinations, especially the United States. Although the proportional weight of the flows to the US has significantly reduced, it remains the final settlement destination for many migrants the US continues to be the major repository of the stock of Cubans residing abroad after they transit through various stages.
One of the most striking aspects of this issue is the official neglect. On the one hand, the authorities of the statistical agencies continue to publish positive migration balances, presenting a fictitious image of a country attracting migrants. On the other hand, there are no known migration agreements–except those with the US–with the many countries that form the stages of Cuban migration trajectories. As a result, Cuban migrants face significant vulnerability and risks during the mobility process, including human trafficking, legal helplessness, multidimensional lack of protection, and various forms of exploitation, among others.
5. Considering the interplay between migration, economic development, and governance, what policy measures can be implemented by both Cuba and the United States to address the root causes of Cuban migration, promote socio-economic stability in Cuba, and foster a mutually beneficial relationship that takes into account the aspirations and well-being of Cuban migrants and their home country?
In short, the migration hemorrhage seems to have no end. It will continue for a long time as many of the more recent immigrants become naturalized U.S. citizens and make use of the preferential immigration system that prioritizes the admission of family members, particularly the closest ones. It is also reasonable to assume that, despite familial ties, these preferences will not necessarily benefit elderly individuals. Typically, their use requires sponsoring family members —who are not always economically secure–to assume financial responsibility to prevent the newcomers from becoming a "public charge." Therefore, continuous emigration will further aggravate, rather than alleviate, the consequences of an aging population. Even so, the government's position is that there is no migration crisis in Cuba today. However, the first element that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) considers in its definition to recognize the presence of such a crisis is precisely the magnitude of the migrant flow involved. All sources indicate that the number of Cuban migrants arriving through various means and admitted just in the United States already exceeds 693,000 between December 2021 and February 2024, which is less than two years.
Some estimates suggest there may have been between 1.4 and 2 million Cuban emigrants combined across all destinations during that period. Just under 80% of the emigrants are between the ages of 15 and 59, which evidently means a significant drain of the population in key economic age groups. However, there will be no labor shortage even today and in the near future (not before 2030). Outside the economically active population, there are just under 3 million people who are able and qualified to work but whom the economic model is unable to absorb. In the 2012 census, approximately 1.5 million people reported a situation other than working or seeking to work. In addition to this group, just over 1 million jobs were ended as they were considered redundant or surplus. Therefore, of the 7.6 million people aged 15 to 64 considered labor resources, just over 4 million are employed.
Between 2007 and 2017, Cuba's Human Development Index fell from 51st to 73rd in the international ranking. From 2017 to 2021, it fell to 83rd, losing another 10 places, driven by other factors such as the loss of 6.2 years in life expectancy at birth. By the biennium 2022-2023, it had dropped to 85th place. No other country in the hemisphere has regressed as much in terms of Human Development. The solution to the problem does not lie in the United States. Although undoubtedly, lifting the embargo could be a key contributor to solving the problems. The country must transition to an economic model oriented towards development and general well-being, with international financial integration that is endogenous, sustainable, and comprehensive. It must aim for a profound paradigm shift, possibly towards a mixed model, as shown by the Scandinavian countries or Vietnam.
In fact, the academia in Cuba has documented an entire inventory of problems in recent decades, many of which have yet to be recognized by the authorities. These authorities continue to insist on "reforming" or "revamping" a model that is the primary obstacle to development. The insistence on temporary solutions has prevented circumventing the multi-crisis process that the country is suffering from today, and that has done nothing but "aggravate the magnitude of the pending challenges"(1) and seriously undermined the "metabolism" of the system. This is what happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990s when their societies imploded.
(1) La Policrisis Y El Poder Que Invierte La Relación Entre Política Y Economía | Cuba Capacity Building Project,” May 30, 2024, https://horizontecubano.law.columbia.edu/news/la-policrisis-y-el-poder-que-invierte-la-relacion-entre-politica-y-economia.